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Abstract
This paper combines a discrete-time dynamic general equilibrium articulation of the stan-
dard model of labor market search with observed U.S. time series measures on employment,
vacancies, and aggregate output to uncover the cyclical properties of three unobserved
forcing variables that comprise the exogenous state of the aggregate labor market: labor
productivity, the rate of job separation, and the allocational eﬃciency of the labor market.
We posit the latter variable to be inversely related to the degree of mismatch in the pool
of searching workers and vacancies, given numbers of each, and identify its movements as
scalar shifts in the standard matching function. Given that the model exactly reconciles
observed net employment changes, our procedure also implies measured time series of the
￿ows into and out of employment. We ￿nd that labor productivity, the job separation rate
and allocational eﬃciency are all procyclical with the latter two highly variable. These
cyclical patterns lead to procyclical implied gross employment ￿ows, thereby concentrating
labor force reallocation during booms. We discuss the implications for conventional views
of business cycle ￿uctuations and for the standard search theories of labor market behavior.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Economists have long acknowledged that buyers and sellers of labor market services are chal-
lenged by search frictions to an extent not experienced by participants in other markets ￿
frictions that originate in the wide cross-sectional variation in worker and job qualities, and the
consequent burden placed upon labor market participants to process this information. With
information frictions at the heart of labor market analysis, it is unfortunate that they are
extraordinarily diﬃcult, or even impossible, to observe in a systematic fashion. Attempts to
understand measured labor market phenomena and their relation to business cycle ￿uctuations
are doubtlessly frustrated by the limitation. This paper proposes an indirect measure of these
hidden labor market qualities by combining information from the observable labor market ag-
gregates with the information derived from a dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) articulation
of the standard labor market search model.
We conceptualize these hidden qualities as an exogenous state vector, the key dimension of
which gauges the degree to which the populations of searching workers and vacant positions are
suited to each other. This then captures the eﬃciency with which labor markets allocate workers
to jobs, and vice versa. Two additional dimensions, the average productivity of workers and the
average rate at which workers separate from their current positions, complete the unobserved
labor market state. Our procedure constructs a unique history of this unobserved state vector
that simultaneously satis￿es the restrictions imposed by DGE search and matching theory and
the observed histories of aggregate output, employment, and vacancies. Given the history of
the exogenous state vector, the internal logic of the search and matching model also implies
realized time series observations on the gross ￿ows of workers into and out of employment.
We intend this study to serve a dual purpose: one of measurement and the other of diagnosis.
In the measurement domain, we gauge the cyclical characteristics of the unobserved exogenous
variables and gross employment ￿ows, measuring their variability and comovements. In doing
so, we provide answers to a number of intriguing questions. Does the degree of labor market
mismatch vary systematically over the business cycle, and if so, is it procyclical or countercycli-
cal? Are the movements of workers into and out of employment procyclical, countercyclical or
2neither? Are the cyclical patterns of the employment in￿ows and out￿ows signi￿cantly diﬀer-
ent, i.e. are they asymmetric? The answers to these questions subsequently carry implications
for the pattern of labor force reallocation over the business cycle, providing a basis for fur-
ther theoretical speculation into the nature of business cycles. A strict Schumpeterian view
of business cycle dynamics, for example, implies countercyclical labor force reallocation and a
nearly teleological interpretation of recessions as periods ￿creative￿ job destruction and factor
reallocation. Our results will clearly inform such discussions.
In its simultaneous treatment of theory and measurement, the techniques that we apply in
this paper not only allow us a glimpse of the unobserved, they also serve a diagnostic purpose
designed to engender a deeper understanding of existing theory. By allocating all of the cycli-
cal variation present in the observed endogenous variables to either theoretical variation, i.e.
variation that is understood by a stable theoretical framework, or to exogenous variation in the
unobserved forcing variables, the procedure separates cyclical phenomena that are understood
through the lens of economic theory, from those that are not. From a pure measurement per-
spective, there is nothing further to be understood: the theory is perfect and so the exogeneity
is well-de￿ned and truly exogenous. Of course, we are not so sanguine. Some of the measured
exogenous cyclical variation inevitably contains some part model misspeci￿cation. Indeed, we
intend this paper to partly serve a ￿pre-theoretical￿ function that informs future modeling eﬀorts
to enrich the current understanding of labor market dynamics and their linkages to aggregate
economic ￿uctuations more generally. We expect such eﬀorts to include theoretical structures
that help explain the comovements between our exogenous variables.1
In recognition of the information problems on both sides of labor markets, Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000) have provided researchers with an analytically conve-
nient and intuitively pleasing framework to capture the costly search process induced by the
informational complexity of labor markets ￿ one which is readily amenable to macroeconomics
analysis. Our theoretical identifying assumptions spring from a DGE implementation of their
1The literature reveals substantial interest in this endeavor. In addition to Merz (1995), Andalfatto (1996),
Cole and Rogerson (1999), and Shimer (2005), a short list includes Lilien (1982), Abraham and Katz (1986),
Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Blanchard and Diamond (1990), Caballero and Hammour (1994), Hall (1995,
2002, 2003), Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000), Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001), Pries (2004).
3framework, at the heart of which is a ￿matching function￿ which determines the number of
job matches formed in a given period ￿ the gross employment in￿ow ￿ as an increasing func-
tion of total job vacancies and the number of searching workers.2 In its simplest form, the
Mortensen-Pissarides framework determines the gross employment out￿ow as an exogenous
constant fraction of total employment ￿ the rate of job separation.
We adopt the Mortensen-Pissaides framework as our instrument of measure primarily for its
ability to reconcile net employment changes with gross employment ￿ows using well-articulated
dynamic economic theory. By construction, the cyclical properties of the three exogenous
forcing variables in our analysis ￿ aggregate labor productivity, the rate of job separation, and
allocational eﬃciency of labor markets ￿ are mutually consistent with the this framework and
the time series observations on employment, vacancies, and aggregate output. The aggregate
labor productivity measure (Z) follows quickly from the model economy￿s resource constraint
and possesses cyclical properties nearly identical to conventional labor productivity measures.
In keeping with the most basic Mortensen-Pissarides model, the rate of job separation (σ) is
exogenous and simply gives the fraction of employed persons that will separate from their jobs,
for whatever reason, during a particular period and must be determined simultaneously with
the exogenous allocational eﬃciency variable.
Our third characteristic of the hidden labor market state captures the eﬃciency with which
existing labor market institutions pair searching workers with available jobs. This is not as
transparent as the ￿rst two and merits further discussion. We take as axiomatic that the
matching function, say M (V,U) ￿w h e r et h e￿ow into employment is a function of the number
of vacancies and searching workers ￿ owes its existence to the notion of mismatch, ￿an empir-
ical concept that measures the degree of heterogeneity in the labor market across a number
of dimensions, usually restricted to skills, industrial sector, and location￿ (Petrongolo and Pis-
sarides, 2001). That is, in the absence of mismatch, jobs and workers would match instantly.
Accordingly, an exogenous increase in labor market mismatch, given the matching inputs (V,U),
decreases the number of matches formed, or equivalently, decreases the ￿allocative eﬃciency￿
2See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a comprehensive review of the literature regarding the matching
function and its role in search and matching models and in empirical studies.
4of the aggregate labor market. Since we are interested in exploring the cyclical properties of
mismatch and allocational eﬃciency, we relax the structural stability of the standard matching
function by allowing exogenous multiplicative shifts in the rate of match formation given the
levels of matching inputs. Thus, we write χM (V,U),w h e r eχ>0 measures the allocational
eﬃciency of the labor markets.3
Given the three exogenous components of the hidden labor market state (Z, σ,a n dχ),
w ea r ea b l et od e r i v em e a s u r e so fj o b￿nding and job separation. Job ￿nding is mediated by
the matching function and is given by the expression χM (U,V ); job separation is simply the
product of the job separation rate and employment, or σN. To measure the exogenous shocks,
we ￿rst derive the complete set of independent theoretical restrictions implied by the socially
eﬃcient allocation of the DGE search model. The model is essentially borrowed from Merz
(1995) and Andalfatto (1996), but abstracts from physical capital accumulation.4 This provides
us with three conditions that characterize the equilibrium allocation of employment, vacancies,
and output: 1) a resource constraint de￿ning the feasible allocations, 2) an Euler equation
i m p l i e db ya ni n t e r t e m p o r a l l ye ﬃcient program of vacancy-creation, and 3) the equation of
motion for employment reconciling gross employment ￿ows with net employment ￿ows. To solve
the model, we log-linearize these conditions and specify a general VAR(1) process to govern
the joint shock process. With knowledge of the parameters de￿ning the VAR(1) process, the
entire system is easily inverted to obtain a history of exogenous shocks conditional on these
parameters. We have no such prior knowledge, of course, and so we follow the simulated method
of moments procedure proposed by Lee and Ingram (1991) to obtain these parameters.
The measurement function of our paper shares the aim of numerous predecessors that mea-
sure unobserved time series characteristics from existing evidence and theoretical restrictions,
with the works of Solow (1956) and Prescott (1986) perhaps the most famous of these. In the
3In principle, χ would also pick up lower frequency instability in the matching function contributed by
technological advances in matching, changes in government policy, and similar changes. By removing a low-
frequency trend from all of the observed endogenous variables prior to analysis, we eﬀectively ￿lter out these
movements in allocational eﬃciency, ap r i o r i .
4Unlike their models, ours abstracts from physical capital accumulation. This simpli￿cation not only allows
us to economize on the number of parameters in the joint distribution of shocks that must be estimated, but
also facilitates comparisons with studies of the aggregate labor market that rely more closely on the original
Mortensen-Pissarides framework (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Cole and Rogerson (1999), and Shimer
(2005a)).
5context of DGE environments, this process is initially formalized by Ingram, Kocherlakota, and
Savin (1994) who advocate the use of singular models to produce inferred shock series that are
unique. This approach was subsequently extended by Chari, Kehoe, and McGratten (2003)
who use maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters governing the distribution of shocks.
They also emphasize the diagnostic role of the procedure. Our technique strongly resembles
theirs, except for the method used to extract the parameters governing the exogenous forcing
process; we use simulated method of moments rather than maximum likelihood.
In its speci￿c attention paid to labor market dynamics, the measurement function shares the
goal of more direct attempts to infer the aggregate cyclical characteristics of gross employment
￿ows using partial evidence oﬀered by inherently incomplete data sets. Blanchard and Diamond
(1990) analyze the gross worker ￿ow data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) compiled
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Unfortunately, these observed worker ￿ows do not
reconcile period-to-period aggregate net employment changes and often display large discrepan-
cies, even of opposite sign. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Davis, Haltitwanger, and Schuh
(1996) construct and analyze gross job ￿ow data in U.S. manufacturing based on plant-level
changes in employment. Given that manufacturing is a small and declining fraction of U.S.
employment, drawing inferences regarding aggregate job and worker ￿ows from their results is
problematic. In contrast to these works, our approach is more ￿top-down￿ than ￿bottom-up￿.
Rather than accepting the limitations imposed by the incompleteness and inaccuracies inherent
in existing direct observations of gross employment ￿ows, our work accepts the restrictions of
existing economic theory as an identifying assumption. Because dynamic general equilibrium
theory is central to our approach, our results provide an internally consistent view of labor
market dynamics and their relationship to economic activity at large.
The view of aggregate employment ￿ows received from the aﬀormentioned studies can be
summarized in three broad strokes. First, gross worker and job ￿ows are large compared to
the corresponding net ￿ows. Second, the average amplitude of ￿uctuations in the employment
out￿ow is larger than that of the employment in￿ow. That is, employment reductions during
recessions are more the consequence of an increase in the outward ￿ow from employment than a
decrease in the inward ￿ow. Third, this cyclical pattern in the employment ￿ows partly re￿ects
6a marked asymmetry in gross job ￿ows: job destruction rises sharply during recessions and job
creation is nearly acyclic. Together, these observations point to a pronounced countercyclical
pattern in labor force reallocation; the available data imply that worker and job ￿ows increase
in recessionary periods and decrease during booms.
Our results support only the ￿rst strand of the received view; beyond that, they imply a
strikingly diﬀerent picture of aggregate labor market dynamics. All unobserved forcing variables
￿ labor productivity, allocative eﬃciency, and the job separation rate ￿ turn out to be strongly
procyclical. There is little surprise regarding labor productivity; our implied measure is quite
similar to traditional de￿nitions. By contrast, our procedure implies that both allocational
eﬃciency and the job separation rate are highly variable. More importantly, the structure
of the model passes along the strong procyclical variation to gross employment ￿ows and this
delivers the startling conclusion that both the ￿ow into employment and ￿ow out of employment
are strongly procyclical. Furthermore, the employment ￿ows are symmetric ￿ap r o p e r t y
that follows from the requirement that the jointly large gross employment ￿ows reconcile the
comparatively small period-to-period observed changes in aggregate employment, i.e. the net
employment ￿ow. In marked contrast to the conventional wisdom, our results imply that the
bulk of labor force reallocation occurs during booms, not recessions. Interestingly, a recent
and quite systematic analysis of the CPS by Shimer (2005b), concludes that the job ￿nding
probability of a representative searching worker is strongly procyclical and the probability of
separation faced by a representative employed worker is approximately acyclical. These ￿ndings
are consistent with the strongly procyclical employment in￿ows and procyclical labor force
reallocation found here, but not with the strong cyclical symmetry of the emploment in￿ows
and out￿ows implied by our procedure.
In the diagnostic realm, the current paper inevitably intersects with explicit eﬀorts ￿ of
which ours is not ￿ to validate or invalidate the Mortensen-Pissarides framework. To our
knowledge, Cole and Rogerson (1999) and Shimer (2005a) are the only such works to date.
The Cole and Rogerson study documents some of the quantitative successes and failures of the
Mortensen-Pissarides framework using a reduced-form approach, but do so with an eye toward
replicating some of the more salient gross job ￿ow facts in U.S. manufacturing (e.g. Davis
7and Haltiwanger, 1992) that we, along with Shimer (2005b), ￿nd to be an unreliable guide to
aggregate employment dynamics.
Shimer (2005a) casts doubt on the quantitative applicability of the Mortensen-Pissarides
framework in the form of a data puzzle. He shows that a general form of the model, which in-
cludes structural stability in matching, cannot produce the wide procyclical variation observed
in the vacancy-unemployment ratio in response to quantitatively reasonable labor productivity
and job destruction shocks. Our results show that with matching function instability, the so-
cially eﬃcient allocations implied by the Mortensen-Pissarides framework are consistent with
procyclical matching eﬃciency and labor market mismatch. We subsequently ask whether the
shocks, and their cyclical properties, provide a reasonable source of aggregate labor market ￿uc-
tuations. The current study complements Shimer￿s as we provide a resolution to the existence
of simultaneously large ￿uctuations in the vacancy-unemployment ratio and small ￿uctuations
in aggregate labor productivity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our version of the
Mortensen-Pissarides model and derives the theoretical restrictions that allow us to identify the
unobserved shocks. In section 3, we brie￿y describe the observed data and its basic statistical
properties. Section 4 presents the simulated method of moments procedure for determining the
VAR(1) process that governs the shocks. Section 5 presents the results and analyzes the cyclical
properties of job creation and destruction as well as those of the underlying shocks. Section 6
interprets these ￿ndings in the context of recent literature. We brie￿y outline our conclusions
and set a direction for future research in Section 7.
2 The Model
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of in￿nitely-lived worker/households distributed
uniformly along the unit interval; there is also a continuum of ￿rms. At the beginning of
each period, a worker is considered either employed or unemployed. The measure of employed
workers is denoted Nt; the measure of unemployed workers is the complement Ut ≡ 1−Nt.T h e





βtU (Ct,N t), 0 <β<1, (1)
where β is the subjective discount factor. Following Merz (1995), the period utility function is
separable in consumption and employment, with








where γ de￿nes the wage elasticity of labor supply at a constant marginal utility of wealth (the
￿Frisch elasticity￿ of labor supply).
Both workers and ￿rms must undergo a costly search process before jobs are created and
output is produced. At the beginning of each period, each unemployed worker searches for a
job expending φ consumption units in the process. Aggregate period-t search costs incurred
therefore equal φ(1 − Nt) consumption units. Firms create job vacancies, but only by expending
κ units of output per vacancy per period, generating aggregate ￿recruiting￿ costs equal to κVt.
Here, as in the traditional Mortensen-Pissarides framework, all jobs must be posted as vacancies
before they can be ￿lled. Once a job is ￿lled, it produces output equal to Zt generating aggregate
output
Yt = ZtNt (2)
where Zt > 0 is the exogenously determined productivity of labor.
The matching function captures the labor market search frictions. The typical formulation
determines the number of job matches formed in a given period, M (Vt,U t),a sa ni n c r e a s i n g
function M of job vacancies, Vt, and the number of job seekers, Ut,w h e r eM exhibits constant
returns to scale. With search costs ultimately arising from heterogeneity-induced information
problems, we interpret the matching function as a mapping from the labor market￿s informa-
tional state in a given period ￿ which implicitly includes the degree of mismatch between the
characteristics of vacant jobs and searching workers ￿ to the number of job matches formed.
To allow for ￿uctuations in mismatch, we generalize the matching function to include a multi-
9plicative shock term, χt. Hence, the number of matches formed in period t is given by
Mt = χtM (Vt,U t)=χtV α
t (1 − Nt)
1−α (3)
where 0 <α<1 and χt is the period-t realization of an unobserved shock process. Increases
in χt raise the number matches formed given the numbers of searching workers and available
positions. Consequently, ￿uctuations in χt signify improvements or deteriorations in the ￿allo-
cational eﬃciency￿ of the labor market.
While job matches are being formed, others a r ed i s s o l v e d . W ea s s u m et h a tt h ef r a c t i o n
of existing matches dissolved during period-t, σt, is also determined as the realization of an
exogenous stochastic process. The period-t change in aggregate employment, i.e. the net
employment ￿ow, is de￿ned as the diﬀerence between the period gross employment in￿ow and
gross employment out￿ow:
Nt+1 − Nt = Mt − σtNt.( 4 )
Note that each ￿ow is directly impacted by unobserved shocks: the ￿ow into employment by
the allocational eﬃciency term, χt, and the out￿ow by the rate at which workers separate from
jobs, σt.
The state of the economy in a given period, or (Nt,e t), consists of the beginning-of-period
employment level Nt, and values of the unobserved and exogenous state vector et =( Zt,χ t,σt).
We make the standard Markovian assumption which allows agents to form expectations of
future-period quantities using knowledge of the current state only. Given the current state, the
socially eﬃcient allocation of employment, vacancies, and consumption, {Nt+1,V t,C t},s o l v e s
the following recursively-de￿ned social planner￿s problem:
υ(Nt,e t)= m a x
Nt+1,Vt,Ct
{U (Ct,N t)+βEtυ(Nt+1,e t+1)} (5)
subject to
Ct + φ(1 − Nt)+κVt ≤ ZtNt. (6)
10Nt+1 =( 1− σt)Nt + χtM (Vt,1 − Nt). (7)
where υ(Nt,e t) is the future discounted social value of employment level Nt and the exogenous
state et. Equation (6) represents the period-t resource constraint prohibiting the sum of cur-
rent expenditures on consumption, job search, and vacancy creation to exceed current output,
and equation (7) describes the trajectory of employment (4) with the matching function (3)
determining the current-period ￿ow into employment.
The corresponding ￿rst-order and envelope conditions imply an Euler equation describing
an intertemporally eﬃcient vacancy-posting scheme for the economy. Suppressing arguments






















equating the loss in welfare resulting from the generation of an additional vacancy with the





gives the average duration of vacancies multiplied by the elasticity of vacancies in matching,
α = VM V .
M . The left-hand side of (8), therefore, represents the utility loss associated with a
marginal increase in vacancies. The expected gain of the marginal vacancy, given by the right-






net social bene￿t ￿o w i n gf r o ma na d d i t i o n a lm a t c hf o r m e di nt h ec u r r e n tp e r i o dt.T h et e r m
Z0 equals the output ￿owing from the match; φ gives the (constant) search costs foregone by





￿ negative since U0
N < 0 and U0
C > 0 ￿
represents the consumption value of the leisure foregone by the newly matched worker. In the
basic Mortensen-Pissarides setup, this quantity is a constant; here it is allowed to vary over the
business cycle according to the worker￿s preferences.
The ￿nal term in braces represents the net future social bene￿t arising from the expected
persistence of a job match. Given that any single current-period match survives with probability





. The second term in this sum, −χ0M0
U, represents the future reduction
in the future job-￿nding rate
χM
U due to the current depletion of the unemployment stock; the






As a system, equations (6)￿(8) characterize the socially-optimal allocation of employment,
vacancies, and consumption given a joint distribution for the exogenous forcing variables or
shocks: Zt, χt and σt. The traditional Mortensen-Pissarides approach determines these quan-
tities in a market equilibrium with a real wage emerging as the outcome of Nash bargaining
between ￿rms and households. The socially optimal allocation characterized above is supported
by a similar market allocation mechanism provided that: 1) asset markets are rich enough for
households to diversify away employment risk, and 2) the relative bargaining power between
households and ￿rms is such that the positive and negative search externalities net out to
zero.5 Although we do not take a position on the precise nature of the allocation mechanism,
we maintain that existing market and institutional arrangements direct the realized allocation
suﬃciently close to the social optimum to establish equations (6)￿(8) as a useful instrument of
measure.
3T h e D a t a
Before proceeding to shock measurement, we brie￿y review some of the well-known facts re-
garding the observed aggregate U.S. labor market measures that bear on our analysis. Given
that the model presented in the previous section does not require a labor market participation
decision for worker/households, we must choose whether to express our employment and unem-
ployment variables, Nt and Ut ≡ 1−Nt relative to labor force or the age 16 and over population.
Although there are valid arguments in favor of both normalizations, we ￿nd that the choice little
aﬀects our results, and choose the labor force (employment plus unemployment) as our reference
population. In the absence of a long time series on actual job vacancies, we follow standard
5Hosios (1990) determines the conditions under which the Pareto-optimum is supported as a decentralized
market equilibrium in a static evironment; Merz (1995) and Andalfatto (1996) do the same in dynamic general
equilibrium settings. The market equilibrium in the current work closely follows those of Merz and Andalfatto.
12practice and construct vacancies from the Conference Board￿s help-wanted advertising index.
The resulting vacancy series, Vt, is also expressed per member of the labor force. Also, since
our model abstracts from the capital accumulation decision, we must choose between aggregate
output and aggregate consumption ￿ a choice that re￿ects our desire to preserve a consistent
and well-understood labor productivity measure and one that can be more readily compared
to those in other studies. Since the aggregate labor input Nt produces all goods and services,
including private investment goods and those purchased by government, real GDP provides the
appropriate output measure. All of our time series are constructed at the quarterly frequency
and run from 1948:1 to 2003:4.
Although we are chie￿y interested in the cyclical properties of these variables, it is useful to
￿rst compare their magnitudes as measured by the sample ￿rst moments: mean employment
(N) equals .944 or 94.4% of the labor force, mean unemployment (U) equals .056 (5.6% of





equals .944. We use these values to assist in preference and
technology parameter calibration.
To describe the business-cycle variation in these quantities, we follow Shimer (2005a) and
remove the low-frequency trend in all variables implied by the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter under a
smoothing parameter of 105. We apply this procedure to remove movements in the aggregates
induced by institutional and technological changes associated with job-matching, so that they
are not spuriously assigned to matching function instability arising from cyclical movements in
labor market mismatch. The cyclical characteristics of the observed variables are summarized
in Table 1. Employment, vacancies, and the vacancies-unemployment ratio are all strongly pro-
cyclical and persistent; unemployment is strongly countercyclical and persistent. Employment
and unemployment both lag output slightly with peak correlations lagging aggregate output
by one quarter. Note as well, the extreme volatility of the vacancy-unemployment ratio with a
standard deviation of 37 percent around its trend. These data also aﬃrm the Beveridge curve
with a strong contemporaneous correlation between vacancies and unemployment of −.920.
Given that our methods imply measures of the bidirectional worker ￿ows between employ-
ment and unemployment (or nonemployment), we brie￿y review some of the existing evidence
13regarding gross job and worker ￿ows here. Direct evidence on the aggregate employment ￿ows
arises primarily from two sources: the gross job ￿ow data from the U.S. manufacturing sector
constructed and analyzed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh
(1996), and the monthly gross ￿ow of workers between employment, unemployment, and ￿not
in the labor force￿ derived from the Current Population Survey (CPS) analyzed most exten-
sively by Blanchard and Diamond (1990). In three broad strokes, the following picture of gross
worker and job ￿ows emerges from these works. First, gross worker and job ￿ows are large
compared to the corresponding net ￿ows. For example, Davis et. al. (1996) report that annual
manufacturing job destruction averages 10.3 percent of total manufacturing employment, and a
corresponding ￿gure for job creation of 9.1 percent. The diﬀerence, approximately the average
net change in manufacturing employment, re￿ects the declining importance of manufacturing
during their sample period. In addition, they report an average quarterly employment in￿ow
of 9.7 percent of employment and average quarterly out￿ow of 9.4 percent.6 Second, the av-
erage amplitude of ￿uctuations in the employment out￿ow (into unemployment or out of the
labor force) is larger than that of the employment in￿ow (from unemployment and outside the
labor force). That is, employment decline during recessions is more the result of an increase
in the outward ￿ow from employment than a decrease in the inward ￿ow. Third, this cyclical
pattern in the employment ￿ows partly re￿ects a sharp asymmetry in gross job ￿ows with job
destruction rising more sharply during recessions than job creation falls. That is, job destruc-
tion is countercyclical and job creation is nearly acyclic. Together, these observations point to a
countercyclical pattern in labor force reallocation; worker and job ￿ows increase in recessionary
periods and decrease during booms.
4M e a s u r i n g t h e S h o c k s
In this section, we present our procedure for measuring the unobserved exogenous shocks to
labor productivity, matching eﬃciency, and the job destruction rate: {Zt,χ t,σt}.
6Job ￿ow averages are based on the 1972:2 - 1988:4 period; worker ￿ow averages are based on the 1972:1
- 1886:4 sample period. Their results on worker ￿ows rely heavily on corrected CPS measures gathered by
Blanchard and Diamond (1990).
144.1 Identiﬁcation and Estimation
To uniquely identify each of the shock series, the observations on employment, vacancies, and
consumption {Nt,V t,C t} are substituted into the theoretical restrictions comprised of equations
(6), (7), and (8). We begin with the observation that the labor productivity shocks {Zt} are
computed directly from the planner￿s resource constraint (6), given the histories of the three
observed, endogenous variables:
Zt =
Ct + φ(1 − Nt)+κVt
Nt
.
Given our calibration of the technology parameters φ and κ (discussed below), the aggregate
search and recruiting costs (the latter two terms of the numerator) sum to only one percent
of steady state output. Coupled with our simpli￿cation allowing measured real GDP to proxy
model consumption, Zt is nearly identical to the traditional average product of labor de￿nition
of labor productivity.
With {Zt} so computed and substituted into the intertemporal eﬃciency condition (8), only
equations (8) and (7) remain in play. These equations along with inferred labor productivity
and the observed endogenous variables jointly imply realizations of allocational eﬃciency and
the job separation rate: {χt} and {σt}. Although computing these series requires surmounting
the usual technical hurdle imposed by evaluating the conditional expectation characteristic of
the intertemporal eﬃciency condition, it is instructive to gather some intuition regarding the
procedure by ￿rst examining the perfect foresight case: with the unobserved, exogenous forcing
variables treated as deterministic sequences, the conditional expectation is vanquished from
equation (8).
First, we examine the implications of the equation of motion (7) reconciling net employ-
ment changes Nt+1 − Nt as the diﬀerence between the employment in￿ow, χtM (Vt,1 − Nt),
and the employment out￿ow, σtNt. Suppose for the moment that the matching function is
structurally stable, or equivalently, allocational eﬃciency is acyclical, i.e. χt = χ all t. Under
15this assumption, the job separation rate is computed as
σt =
χM (Vt,1 − Nt) − (Nt+1 − Nt)
Nt
using the observations on vacancies and employment. The result, although not apparent from
the expression, contradicts conventional wisdom: the job separation rate turns out to be pro-
cyclical, rising during booms and falling during recessions. Instead, suppose that χt is allowed
to vary under the assumption that the job separation rate is constant or acyclical: σt = σ all
t. Then, χt, computed as
χt =
Nt+1 − Nt + σNt
M (Vt,1 − Nt)
,
turns out to be countercyclical, falling during booms and rising during recessions. This signals
higher degrees of labor market mismatch during recoveries than recessions ￿ a view that is con-
sistent with recessions as periods of ￿cleaning up,￿ but also one which is potentially inconsistent
with an intertemporally eﬃcient allocation of vacancies.
To investigate this possibility, we next turn to the perfect foresight version of the intertem-
























separating the expressions containing the unobserved exogenous shock terms, χ and σ,f r o m
those containing exclusively observed variables. The right-hand side expression, containing only
observed variables, is sharply countercyclical in spite of the fact that labor productivity (Z0) is
procyclical. Ignoring the constant search-cost term, φ,t h e￿nal two terms on the right-hand






rate at which the representative worker/household demands consumption units in exchange
for additional labor time ￿ is straightforward. During booms, or periods of high employment
and high consumption, the marginal disutility of work increases and the marginal utility of
consumption decreases; the opposite is true during recession. Given that the term is negative,









U0,( 1 0 )
represents the future vacancy costs imposed by the current draining of the unemployment pool
to ￿ll available positions. Given that it directly inherits the strongly procyclical nature of the
vacancy-unemployment ratio, its negative sign makes it strongly countercyclical. And, though
our calibration of κ and α implies considerable damping of the extreme variation in the vacancy-











, so that even if the latter term is held constant (as the traditional Mortensen-Pissarides
framework implies), the right-hand side of (9) remain strongly countercyclical.
To see how the unobservables χ and σ must respond to maintain the equality in (9), it is
useful to approximate the persistence in the marginal utility of consumption and allocational
eﬃciency by equating current-period variables with the corresponding one-period-ahead vari-
ables: UC = U0
C and χ = χ0. With these approximations, the perfect foresight intertemporal




















Since increases in allocational eﬃciency correspond to decreases in the left-hand side of this
relation, a constant rate of job separation σ0 implies countercyclical allocational eﬃciency χ0,
large in recessions, small during booms. Alternatively, given that increases in the rate of job
separation σ0 produce increases in the left-hand side, ￿xing allocational eﬃciency implies a pro-
cyclical job separation rate, small in booms and large during recessions. Therefore, the perfect
foresight approximation of our model economy does not lead us to a quick answer regard-
ing the broad cyclical properties of allocational eﬃciency and the job separation rate. Given
average labor productivity inferred from the aggregate resource constraint (8), the equation-of-
motion for employment and the deterministic Euler equation, taken separately, imply opposing
comovements for each. Whereas the equation-of-motion for employment requires procyclical al-
locational eﬃciency and a countercyclical job separation rate, the deterministic Euler equation
17implies countercyclical allocational eﬃciency and a procyclical job separation rate.
We now proceed to the complete measurement procedure to produce a unique realization of
unobserved shocks that jointly satisfy the observed data and the theoretical restrictions of the
model. To overcome the usual analytical hurdles introduced by solving (8), we proceed by log-
linearizing the system (6)￿(8) around its steady state. Dropping the time subscript to denote
steady-state values and using lower-case letters to represent the corresponding log-deviation



























. To complete the conditional evaluation of expectations, we must
complement the log-linearized eﬃciency conditions with a VAR(1) structure to the exogenous
shocks:
e et+1 = Ae et + εt+1 (12)
where e et =( zt,e χt,e σt)
0, A is a 3 ￿ 3 matrix of constants, and εt =
¡
εzt,εe χt,ε e σt
¢0 is trivariate
normal with Eεt =0and E[εtε0
t]=Σ.
Given values for the nine parameters comprising the VAR(1) matrix of coeﬃcients A,t h e
decision rules mapping the period-t state (nt,s t,e et) into values for the endogenous variables
(nt+1,v t,c t) are required to be log-linear as follows:
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
πnn πnz πne χ πne σ
πvn πvz πve χ πve σ
πcn πcz πce χ πce σ

   

(13)
where the π parameters are expressions comprised of technology and preference parameters.
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18Given data series for employment, vacancies, and consumption, the left-hand side of this ex-
pression is a vector of constants in any given period. With values of all model parameters in
hand, the matrix b Π is easily inverted to yield the period-t realization of the forcing process:
(zt,e χt,e σt). Also, substituting the sequence of shock realizations {zt,e χt,e σt}
T
t=0 into the VAR(1)




t=1.O fc o u r s e ,
all of this assumes knowledge of the unknown constants in Π. Although there is suﬃcient in-
dependent evidence to calibrate the technology and preference parameters that help comprise
these constants, the same cannot be said of the unknown coeﬃcients of matrix A. In the absence
of useful ap r i o r iinformation concerning the stochastic properties of the forcing variables, the
available time series evidence must be ￿ltered through the theoretical identifying restrictions
to infer these characteristics.
Assuming values for technology parameters (α,κ,φ), preference parameters (β,γ), and un-
conditional steady-state values (N,V,U,C,Z,χ,σ),w em u s td e t e r m i n et h e15 parameter values
of the vector θ comprised of the 9 coeﬃcients of the 3 ￿ 3 VAR(1) coeﬃcient matrix, A,a n d
the 6 independent parameters of the 3￿3 variance-covariance matrix of innovations, Σ.G i v e n
that our model is singular by construction, it yields a large number of moments to serve as
parameter selection criteria. Furthermore, since the unobserved forcing variables represent all
of the residual variation that is left behind by theory and observation, we choose 15 moment
conditions for an exact identi￿cation of parameters values. Thus, we de￿ne θ as
θ =a r gm i n
θ
[m − m(θ)]
0 [m − m(θ)]
minimizing the distance between a 15-dimensional vector of theoretical moments m(θ) and the
corresponding 15-dimensional vector of observed data moments, m.7 The theoretical moments,
however, involve unobserved exogenous variables, and so cannot be determined analytically. As
a consequence, we apply the simulated method of moments (SMM) procedure advocated by
Ingram and Lee (1991), substituting simulated moments for the theoretical moments. We refer
the interested reader to Appendix B for further details of the estimation procedure.
7The vector θ must therefore also solve the 15-equation nonlinear system m(θ)=m.
194.2 Calibration
With a large empirical literature to draw upon and stationary labor market variables at hand, we
combine micro-evidence with long-run data averages to calibrate the steady state values of the
exogenous shocks and the technology parameters. We begin by setting the steady state values
of the labor market variables, Nt, Vt,a n dUt, equal to the corresponding data ￿rst moments:
N = .944, V = .047,a n dU = .056. Given these values, we observe that the steady-state version
of the equation-of-motion for employment (7), or
σN = χV αU1−α, (15)
sharply restricts the steady state values of the shocks, χt and σt, and matching technology
parameter, α. Based on Blanchard and Diamond￿s (1989) estimates of the U.S. aggregate
matching function, we set α equal to .6. The steady state rate of job separation is chosen
to be 10 percent of total employment per quarter, or σ = .10, based on the CPS worker
￿ow data reported by Davis, et. al. (1996) that uses the correction of Abowd and Zellner
(1985). Under these settings, the steady state employment condition (15) subsequently pins
down steady state allocative eﬃciency level: χ =1 .856. These values imply steady state
gross employment ￿ows of σN = M = .094 per quarter, or 9.4 percent of the labor force.
Furthermore, the average duration of a vacancy, (M/V)
−1, implied is .502 quarters or about
45 days, reproducing the value reported by van Ours and Ridder (1992) using data from the
Dutch economy (although their number is not explicitly a target in our calibration). The
implied unemployment duration is .599 quarters, or 54 days.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the steady state of inferred aggregate output to
equal one, ZN =1 , yielding steady-state labor productivity Z =1 /N =1 .06. Under this
assumption, the steady state resource constraint becomes
C + φU + κV =1 .
Note that in the absence of search and recruiting costs, i.e. φ = κ =0 , labor productivity
20reduces to the traditional average product of labor de￿nition. Steady state labor productivity
equals C−1 in that case. (Recall that we must proxy consumption with aggregate output, or
real GDP.) In the presence of search and recruiting costs, our imputed output measure deviates
from measured real GDP somewhat, but we anticipate the magnitude of the diﬀerence to be
small, with the settings of parameters φ and κ largely determining the gap. Unlike the model￿s
other parameters, independent evidence regarding these two parameters is scarce. We follow
Andalfatto (1996) in assuming steady state recruiting expenditures to be one percent of output,
or κV = .01, implying κ = .211; with no better information regarding the cost of search borne
by workers, we assume that steady state search costs are likewise one percent of aggregate
output, φU = .01, yielding φ = .177. The steady state value of consumption is therefore
C = .98, or 98 percent of output.
Finally, we consider the two preference parameters, β and γ, the subjective discount factor
and the Frisch elasticity of the labor supply, respectively. We choose β = .99 consistent with a
steady-state risk-free real interest rate of 4 percent. We follow Merz￿s (1995) interpretation of
the empirical literature and choose γ =1 .5 for the Frisch elasticity.
5R e s u l t s
In this section we characterize the dynamic properties of the forcing variables ￿ labor produc-
tivity, allocational eﬃciency, and the job separation rate ￿ and those of gross employment ￿ows
that follow from the former. We ￿rst discuss the properties of these ￿ve series as if they are
products of pure measurement. In other words, we assume that our version of the Mortensen-
Pissarides model suﬀers no misspeci￿cation errors implying accurate time series measurement of
the exogenous forcing variables and corresponding gross employment. We subsequently address
the possibility of model misspeci￿cation.
The simulated method-of-moments procedure discussed in the previous section determines
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We now turn to the time series realizations of these shocks as implied by the realized innovations
'
εzt,εe χt,ε e σt
“
, (12), and the above estimate of the VAR(1) coeﬃcient matrix A.
5.1 Cyclical Properties of the Shocks
The statistics reported in Table 2 provide our ￿rst glimpse of the dynamic behavior of exoge-
nous shocks; corresponding characteristics of inferred output are also reported for benchmark
comparisons. In interpreting these statistics, it should be recalled that inferred output is nearly
identical to actual output measured by real GDP due to the relatively small size of aggregate
search and recruiting costs (and equivalently, that model consumption is nearly identical to
aggregate output). For each shock series, we examine: 1) volatility, or the amplitudes of the
￿uctuations around trend measured by the percentage standard deviation from trend, 2) the
comovements of the variables as measured by the contemporaneous correlations with inferred
output, and 3) phase shifts measured by locating peak correlations with output over a domain
of four lags and four leads.
We begin by noting the standard univariate properties of aggregate output: its typical de-
viation from trend is roughly 2 percent and is quite persistent with an autocorrelation function
that reveals a steady but inertial decline in the linear dependence upon past values. As an-
ticipated from numerous prior studies, average labor productivity is strongly procyclical and
displays roughly one-half the variation of output. It is a bit more persistent than aggregate
output and has no tendency to lead or lag the cycle.8
8In contrast, labor productivity constructed using an hours measure of the labor input tends to lead the cycle
by a quarter or two. See Kydland (1995).
22Turning our attention to the dynamics of allocational eﬃciency and the job separation rate,
we see that both display conspicuous deviations about trend, especially the job separation rate.
The 30.3 percent standard deviation about trend in allocational eﬃciency is roughly 14 times
that of aggregate output and gives clear support to the hypothesis that the matching function
is structurally unstable. The job separation rate, with a standard deviation equal to 47.7
percent trend, is approximately 22 times more volatile than output. As the case with labor
productivity, allocational eﬃciency and the job separation rate are strongly procyclical, and
both show contemporaneous correlations of about .90. Both are persistent, but less so than
aggregate output and labor productivity; job separation is less persistent than allocational
eﬃciency. These properties are plainly evident in Figures 1￿3 which display the time series plot
of each forcing variable against inferred output. We defer our discussion of these ￿ndings and
for now, simply note that they are clearly consistent with the view that much of the interesting
behavior of labor markets is buried in the gross employment ￿ows.
5.2 Gross Employment Flows
Our measurements of labor market allocational eﬃciency and the aggregate job separation rate
imply time series histories for the gross employment ￿ows between the state of unemployment
and employment (or not employed). In model terms, the period-t employment in￿ow equals
χtM (Vt,1 − Nt);t h ep e r i o d - t out￿ow equals σtNt.
Before reporting our measures of gross labor ￿ows, we feel it important to caution against
using industry-level data on gross job and worker ￿ows to infer corresponding aggregate prop-
erties. Since industry-level employment ￿ows are subject to signi￿cant leakage ￿ e.g. workers
leave manufacturing for other sectors, and vice versa ￿ the cyclical characteristics of the in￿ows
and out￿ows can diﬀer markedly. Aggregate quantities, of course, are not exposed to intersec-
toral leakages. Additionally, job ￿ows are conceptually distinct from employment ￿ows: the
latter include movements associated with the ￿ow of workers separate from the ￿ow of jobs
(e.g. quits and layoﬀs). Given that aggregate net employment ￿ows are small ￿ the average
absolute quarterly ￿ow averages .27 percent of the labor force with a standard deviation from
trend of only .40 percent ￿ it is impossible for the bidirectional gross employment ￿ows to
23inherent such strong cyclical asymmetry. If gross ￿ows are large in the aggregate, then cyclical
properties of the in￿ows and out￿ows must be nearly identical. Any sharp increase or decrease
in one, must be matched by a similarly sharp increase or decrease in the other, to maintain the
narrow diﬀerence between the two, i.e. the comparatively small net employment change. By
implication, the gross employment ￿ows are fairly symmetric in their cyclical properties and
either ￿ow captures well the movements in labor reallocation over the cycle.
The relevant question is then two-fold. First, are the gross ￿ows highly variable? If so,
are they jointly procyclical, countercyclical, or neither? Adherence to the conventional view
that aggregate employment in￿ows are procyclical (perhaps mildly) and employment out￿ows
are countercyclical is certain to produce disappointment; one pillar must fall. The statistics in
T a b l e2a r er e v e a l i n g .W e￿rst note that our procedure produces gross employment ￿ows that
are indeed highly variable. Both display standard deviations roughly 45% standard deviation
from trend with the in￿ow slightly more volatile. Next, we see that the correlations of the gross
￿ows with contemporaneous output at four leads and lags reveals both to be strongly procyclical
and persistent. Thus, it is the cyclical behavior of the inferred employment out￿ow that de￿es
conventional wisdom. Here, it is procyclical, rising during booms and declining during reces-
sions, along with the ￿ow into employment. The statistics in Table 2 also reveal a pronounced
phase separation of one ￿ow from the other, with the employment out￿ow correlating with
output most strongly during the leading periods relative to the in￿ow. This indicates that the
employment out￿ow tends to lead the in￿ow. Figure 4, plotting the log-deviations from trend of
both ￿ows, convincingly illustrates both the tight procyclical relationship and the phase shift.
The lagging characteristic of the employment in￿ow mirrors the well-known tendency for total
employment to increase in the wake of recessionary periods. The shaded regions depict recession
periods designated by the National Bureau of Economic Research (henceforth, NBER).
Finally, we investigate the primitive levels of the gross ￿ows implied by steady state levels
and the log-deviations shown in Figure 5. As reported earlier, the calibration of our model
implies steady state gross ￿ows of .094 workers per member of the labor force per quarter.
Figure 8 indicates that the imputed employment ￿ows range between 2 percent to 24 percent
of the labor force per quarter. This ￿gure clearly shows the procyclicality of the implied
24gross ￿ows, rising during expansions and reaching a peak before each NBER-de￿ned recession,
subsequently falling through the recession-period, occasionally reaching a trough well after
the NBER-recession ending date. To gain perspective on the magnitude of this variation,
Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) report quarterly job destruction rates (jobs destroyed as
a fraction of employment) in their 1972:2￿1988:4 quarterly sample period ranging between 3
percent and 11 percent per quarter. In comparing these ￿gures, one must keep in mind that our
method allows for worker ￿ows not captured by changes in job ￿ows. Given, that Davis, et. al.
also estimate that total job reallocation (roughly the sum of job creation and job destruction)
only accounts for between one-third and one-half of total worker reallocation, the variation in
their manufacturing job destruction ￿ow is comparable in magnitude to the variation in gross
employment ￿ows computed here for the entire economy.
6 Discussion
6.1 The mechanics
We begin our analysis of the results by identifying the mechanisms of the model that act in
concert with the more salient cyclical properties of the observed data to produce the results
highlighted in the previous section. Motivated by the persistent, procyclical movements of
labor productivity Zt (Table 2, Figure 1), and the impulse response functions suggesting an
independent role of the labor productivity shock (Figures 4-6), we ￿rst trace out the dynamics
engendered by our DGE version of Mortensen-Pissarides model in response to a sudden and
persistent increase in labor productivity, holding constant allocational eﬃciency χt and the rate
of job separation σt. Due to persistence, a current shock, i.e. innovation, signals greater future
productivity as captured by the term Z0 in the intertemporal eﬃciency condition (8), producing
a current increase in vacancies as ￿rms respond to the higher anticipated productivity bene￿ts
of ￿lled positions. Consequently, additional job matches form in the period of impact ￿ matches
that become productive in the ensuing period ￿ thereby increasing employment and reducing
unemployment. These eﬀects are summarized by an increasing vacancies-unemployment ratio.
The innovation in labor productivity also sets in motion forces that work to reduce the
25vacancy-unemployment ratio. To see this, one ￿rst notes that the resource constraint (6) trans-
lates the ensuing anticipated increase in future productivity and employment into an increase
future consumption through an augmented ￿ow of output.9 The increases in employment and
consumption subsequently reduce the representative worker￿s marginal willingness to substitute





in equation (8). This oﬀsets to some
extent an individual ￿rm￿s propensity to create vacancies and the attending increase in employ-
ment. Furthermore, the current reduction in the employment pool persists and oﬀsets some of






. This term represents the additional future recruiting costs exacted by the depleted
stock of searching workers on the right hand side of (8). Recall that this last quantity (or more
precisely, its absolute value) is directly proportional to the vacancy-unemployment ratio ￿ a
proxy for the ￿tightness￿ of the labor market. The data, as we have seen, displays extremely
large procyclical variation in this ratio, and casts doubt on the model￿s ability to produce the
required cyclical variation in response to realistically sized shocks to labor productivity.10
By allowing both matching eﬃciency and the job separation rate to vary over the business
cycle, our identi￿cation procedure responds to this tension by, in eﬀect, equating the observed
vacancy-unemployment ratio with the socially optimal one in each period. The highly vari-
able and procyclical allocative eﬃciency shock χt (Table 2, Figure 2) eﬀectively increases the
expected gains of vacancy creation in the face of an exogenous increase in labor productivity,
thus generating additional vacancies while also increasing the rate at which unemployed work-
ers meet up with them. As a result, the ￿ow of workers from unemployment to employment
increases, reducing the unemployment pool. The increase in vacancies coupled with the de-
crease in unemployment, thus gives an additional upward push to the vacancy-unemployment
ratio moving the economy along the Beveridge curve in accord with the data. Although the
vacancy-employment ratio is moving decidedly in the proper direction, it cannot do so with
a sizeable increase in net employment, all else constant. As aggregate employment revealing
9The sum of search and vacancy-creation costs, φ(1 − Nt)+κVt, small and the increase in vacancy-creation
costs κVt counteract the reduction in search costs φ(1 − Nt).
10This point is convincingly demonstrated by Shimer (2005) using a more conventional Mortensen-Pissarides
model with a structurally stable matching function. We are indebted to his work for articulating the opposing
forces on the theoretical vacancy-unemployment ratio restraining its response to labor productivity shocks.
26relatively small period-to-period changes, a complete picture of labor market dynamics requires
more employment out￿o wt or e s t o c kt h eu n e m p l o y m e n tp o o ld e p l e t e db yg r e a t e re ﬃciency in
matching. This element, of course, is provided by the procyclical rate of job separation σt
(Table 2, Figure 3).
Given that these labor market dynamics are largely driven by systematic variation in the
allocative eﬃciency of the labor market, it is instructive to study the implied average dura-
tions of vacancies and unemployment spells over the cycle. In the standard setting, the stable
matching function forms the basis for monotonic mappings of the vacancy-unemployment ra-
tio into the durations: increasing for vacancies, decreasing for unemployment. Given that the
observed vacancy-unemployment ratio is strongly procyclical, a stable matching function pro-
duces average vacancy durations that fall during recessionary periods and rise during booms,
with opposite movements for the unemployment durations. By contrast, the durations implied
by the matching function multiplied by our procyclical allocational eﬃciency series are both
countercyclical, with unemployment durations up much more sharply than vacancy durations
during recessionary periods. Figure 6 clearly shows this cyclical behavior, with the average
unemployment duration reaching nearly 5 quarters during 1982, an extreme event by this mea-
sure, and the corresponding vacancy duration reaching roughly 1.5 quarters. Figure 7 compares
the average vacancy durations implied by a stable matching function (χ set to its steady state
value) versus the one implied by the inferred allocative eﬃciency series; Figure 8 show the
corresponding comparison for the average unemployment durations. Qualitatively, the counter-
cyclical behavior of vacancies implied by the current approach is at odds with the traditional,
stable matching function model. Quantitatively, the procedure implies cyclical variation in
average employment durations well in excess of those implied by a stable matching function.
The implication of procyclical labor force reallocation is broadly consistent with recent
and independent work by Shimer (2005b) who infers aggregate job ￿nding and job separation
probabilities from employment, unemployment, and unemployment duration data based on the
Current Population Survey of the BLS. Although he ￿nds the job ￿nding probability to be
strongly procyclical as in the current study, the job separation probability is nearly acyclical.
Additionally, Shimer￿s strongly procyclical job ￿nding probablility is re￿ective of our strongly
27countercyclical average unemployment duration. The combined eﬀect, of course, implies the
procyclical labor force reallocation property that is found by our procedure, but not the tight
procyclical symmetry between the ￿ows that we derive as a consequence of matching the period-
to-period changes in aggregate employment. Both studies, nonetheless, imply a radical change
in thinking regarding behavior of employment ￿ows over the business cycle from the wisdom
received from the manufacturing job ￿ow studies (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992 and Davis,
Haltwanger, and Schuh, 1996) and earlier analysis of worker ￿ows based on the CPS data
(Blanchard and Diamond, 1990).
6.2 Measurement: Implications for Business Cycles
Here, we brie￿y play the devil￿s advocate role and treat our ￿ndings as pure measurement, and
discuss the implications for our understanding of labor market dynamics and business cycles.
Perhaps the most striking result is the procyclical behavior of labor force reallocation,
with NBER recession periods consistently marked by falling gross employment ￿ows. Adjusted
worker ￿ow data derived from the CPS indicates the reverse pattern. In their analyses of these
data, Davis, et. al. (1996) conclude that ￿the countercyclical behavior of both in￿ows and
out￿ows is consistent with the view that recessions are periods of intense restructuring activity
in the economy￿ (p. 134).11 In a similar vein, Blanchard and Diamond (1990) conclude that
the asymmetrically large cyclical ￿uctuations in the employment out￿ow compared to those of
the employment in￿ow ￿rules out a Schumpeterian view of cyclical ￿uctuations, with booms as
times when inventions are implemented yielding high job creation.￿ The CPS data is instead
consistent with the popular view of recessions as ￿cleansing￿ mechanisms, or periods in which
unproductive ￿rms, jobs, and techniques are erased from the productive system. In other words,
recessions should be marked by substantial factor reallocation, including labor reallocation, in
comparison to booms.
11In making this statement, they are mindful of the strength of comovements linking aggregate worker ￿ows
and manufacturing job ￿ows. Their measures of manufacturing job destruction and aggregate unemployment
in￿ows both rise sharply during recessions and bear a high contemporaneous correlation (0.71); although employ-
ment out￿ows display less cyclical variation, its contemporaneous correlation to job destruction is nonetheless
substantially positive (0.47). The statistical linkage between unemployment ou￿ows and employment in￿ows on
the one hand, and job creation on the other, is much weaker (contemporaneous correlations of 0.16 and 0.22).
28At the level of the unobserved shocks, the procyclical pattern of labor reallocation is pro-
duced by the twin procyclical forces of allocative eﬃciency (χt)a n dt h er a t eo fj o bs e p a r a t i o n
(σt). According to our interpretation, declining allocative eﬃciency during recessionary periods
is symptomatic of a widening gulf between the locations and skills of unemployed workers, and
the locations and required skills of ￿rms with vacancies. That is, recession are periods when the
symmetric incomplete information problem of labor market search is aggravated, and hence it
is comparatively diﬃcult for ￿rms and workers to form productive matches. The reduced rate
of job destruction complements this view. Figures 7 and 8 oﬀer another perspective on this
phenomenon, showing the strong tendency for both average vacancy durations and unemploy-
ment durations to rise during recessions, presumably indicating a large number of potential job
matches that are foregone. If cleansing is to be temporally concentrated at all, the results indi-
cate that it will occur during booms, when productivity, matching eﬃciency, and job separation
are all on the rise.
Save for the cyclical timing, we maintain that the picture of labor market dynamics and
business cycles is decidedly Schumpeterian. Again, we note that labor productivity, the rate of
job separation, and allocational eﬃciency are all procyclical. In the Schumpeterian perspective,
productivity improvements stem from innovative ￿urries and rapid technology adoption that
leads to the ￿creative destruction￿ of unproductive jobs and rapid reallocation of the labor force.
The comparatively high rates of job separation (σt) measured during boom periods re￿ect not
only involuntary separations from creative job destruction, but also increased quits as workers
capitalize on better opportunities. The improved allocational eﬃciency of labor markets (χt)
during these periods signals an amelioration of the two-sided information problems as more
matches are formed from a given number of vacancies and searching workers. It is as if a
signi￿cant proportion of the work force, queued in either unemployment or unproductive jobs
during recessions, are gradually matched in more productive jobs as recession gives way to
the ￿productivity-storm￿ of a boom. As new opportunities are created, so are incentives for
the reallocation of the labor force across activities and locations. In a descriptive vein, our
perspective on business cycle dynamics improves upon the Schumpeterian one as it does not
produce labor productivity that is counterfactually countercyclical.
296.3 Diagnosis: Implications for Theory
Perhaps the most striking of our results is the implied procyclicality of the gross aggregate
employment ￿ows in the face of the conventional wisdom received from incomplete survey data
implying countercyclical (and asymmetric) ￿ows. By itself, we do not feel that the aberration
is suﬃcient to declare the model invalid as measurement device. The CPS data on gross worker
￿ows is notoriously unreliable. A number of systematic biases inherent in the measurement
procedure have been identi￿ed and corrective measures proposed.12 Even more disturbing from
our point of view, however, is that these data do not yield the net employment changes implied
by the published data, and often the implied net change is of the wrong sign. As we have already
stressed, if we require that the employment ￿ows reconcile with the net changes and accept,
a priori, the notion that the gross ￿ows are large, asymmetry in the measured ￿ows cannot
prevail ￿ in￿ows and out￿ows must rise and fall together over the cycle. As for manufacturing
job ￿ow data, it represents a small and declining proportion of U.S. economy: manufacturing
employment currently accounts for approximately 10 percent of total employment. In contrast,
our employment ￿ows exactly reconcile the observed aggregate net employment changes and
are, by construction, comprehensive.
Two of three theoretical identifying restrictions imposed by the model are suﬃciently trans-
parent and without controversy. The resource constraint (6) along with observed data provides
an aggregate labor productivity measure Zt that is nearly identical to the standard output per
worker de￿nition of aggregate labor productivity. The equation-of-motion for employment (7)
de￿nes a simple ￿ow-stock reconciliation.
The intertemporal eﬃciency condition (8), by comparison, is rich with content. We have
a l r e a d ye x a m i n e dt h ep e r f e c tf o r e s i g h tv e r s i o no ft h i se q u a t i o ni nS e c t i o n4i nm o t i v a t i n go u r
measurement procedure. In that analysis, we paid some attention to the role played by the
strongly procyclical nature of expression (10) which represents the future recruiting costs ex-
acted as a consequence of running down the stock of unemployed persons to ￿ll current positions.
This expression shows these costs to be determined solely by the technological aspects of match-
12Blanchard and Diamond (1990) and Davis, et. al. (1996) report results using data based on adjustments
proposed by Abowd and Zellner (1985).
30ing, and inherit its strongly procyclical behavior directly from the pronounced procyclicality
of the vacancy-unemployment ratio. Much of the identi￿cation burden is thus placed on the
precise speci￿cation of the matching function, i.e. the constant-returns Cobb-Douglas matching
function (3) which implies a unit constant elasticity of substitution between the two matching
inputs of vacancies and unemployment.
As an alternative to Cobb-Douglas, consider the more general constant elasticity of substi-










where −1 <ρ<∞ determines the elasticity of substitution, 1
1+ρ,a n dη>0 determines the
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becomes constant and equal to 1−α
α . That is, as unemploy-
ment and vacancies become perfect substitutes in matching, the degree of measured procyclical





is reduced to zero, and consequently, so is its corresponding in￿uence
in the intertemporal eﬃciency condition for vacancies (8). The economics of this result are as
follows.13 In terms of (8), an exogenous increase in labor productivity (Z0)r a i s e st h ev a l u eo fa
￿lled position relative to the value of non-market activities (U0
N/U0
C) and search costs foregone
(φ), thereby encouraging the substitution of vacancies for unemployment leading to an increase
in the vacancies-unemployment ratio. With great ease of substitution between vacancies and
unemployment in matching, the magnitude of this response is large. In relation to our results,
the exogenous increases required from the allocational eﬃciency χ and the job separation rate
σ in producing a large observed increase in the vacancy-unemployment ratio diminishes with
increases in the substitutability of the matching inputs.14 Note also that the returns to scale
13This intuition mirrors that given by Shimer (2005) in his diagnostic evaluation of the Mortensen-Pissarides
model.
14Shimer, however, notes that Blanchard and Diamond￿s (1989) 0.74 point estimate of the elasticity of substi-
tution goes the other way, but not with enough precision to reject the Cobb-Douglas unit elasticity case. With
less substitutability, even more forcing is required from χ and σ.
31parameter η drops from expression (16), implying that a resolution is not to be found in the
thickness of market externalities.
Finally, we brie￿y mention a weakness arising not from theory per se, but in the inex-
act mapping between the model variables and observed endogenous variables. In particular, we
made the simplifying assumption that output is either consumed or used up in the labor market
search process. Given that the latter component is small, our model is akin to a representative
agent asset-pricing model with equilibrium consumption equal to output. To proxy aggregate
consumption, we opted for the aggregate output measure of real GDP (per member of the
labor force) over the consumption of nondurables and services. The primary advantage of this
approach is in keeping our measure of labor productivity as close as possible to the traditional
average product of labor de￿nition. Given their strong cyclical similarities ￿ consumption is
strongly procyclical and only a bit less variable than real GDP ￿ we do not expect that a switch
from an output-based consumption measure to actual consumption would reverse our main
results. The alternative is to complicate the model by admitting investment and capital accu-
mulation. By producing another eﬃciency condition, the set of theoretical restrictions increases
from three to four, necessitating the de￿nition of another unobserved exogenous variable and
an increase in the number of parameters to be estimated from 15 to 24, signi￿cantly increasing
the computational burden. This extension is beyond the scope of this paper, but research is
ongoing to shed light on this and the other aforementioned issues.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have demonstrated that the Mortensen-Pissarides model of labor market search combined
with the observed time series for aggregate output, employment, and vacancies is consistent
with considerable procyclical variation in both the allocative eﬃciency of labor markets and
the rate of job separation. Given that the model exactly reconciles observed net employment
changes with gross employment ￿ows, and that the data determines the net employment changes
from period-to-period, the model and data also imply measures for the employment in￿ow and
out￿ow. Much of this result is simple arithmetic. The small and procyclical period-to-period
32changes observed in aggregate employment, combined with large predicted gross employment
￿ows, implies virtually identical cyclical characteristics in in￿ows and out￿ows. In the aggregate,
n oa s y m m e t r yi ne m p l o y m e n t￿ows can be observed. They are either both procyclical or both
countercyclical and our results imply that they are procyclical.
Our investigation into the mechanics of the DGE search model that, along with the data,
produces these results, echoes Shimer￿s (2005a) diagnostic exploration of Mortensen-Pissarides
framework. He shows that subjecting the more conventional environment, which includes a
stable matching function, to reasonably sized shocks in labor productivity and job separation
cannot produce the substantial variation in the vacancy-unemployment ratio evinced by the
data. In contrast, our procedure allows the allocational eﬃciency of the labor market to vary
along with labor productivity and the job separation rate, so that the search model achieves a
perfect ￿t with the observed data, including the marked variation in the vacancy-unemployment
ratio. The simultaneous procyclical variation required of both labor market allocative eﬃciency
a n dt h ej o bs e p a r a t i o nr a t ep r o v i d e sa na l t e r n a t i ve interpretation of Shimer￿s conclusions regard-
ing the Mortensen-Pissarides model. Additionally, our conclusion that labor force reallocation
is procyclical is broadly consistent with Shimer￿s (2005b) analysis of the CPS data which ￿nds
procyclical job ￿nding probabilities and nearly acyclical job separation probabilities.
The results also shed light on the nature of business cycle ￿uctuations. Perhaps most
importantly, they do not support the cleansing hypothesis, or the view that recessions are
periods of intense factor reallocation that clears ineﬃcient ￿rms, jobs, and production techniques
from the productive system. Conceptually, the cleansing hypothesis has a close kinship with
the Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction, wherein innovations and technology adoption
provide the catalyst for factor reallocation. Both views imply that factor reallocation is clustered
during recessionary periods. Our results deliver the opposite cyclical timing: labor reallocation
is concentrated during booms, not recessions. If cleansing is to occur, it is to occur during the
expansionary phase of the cycle. Our results do not rule out Schumpeterian creative destruction,
only its timing. This modi￿cation of the standard Schumpeterian cyclical schematic actually
improves it standing with the facts as it does not imply counterfactually countercyclical labor
productivity.
33Our procedure has forced all of the about-trend variation in aggregate output, unemploy-
ment, and vacancies that cannot be understood by the Mortensen-Pissarides framework into
the three exogenous variables: labor productivity, the job separation rate, and allocative eﬃ-
ciency. We expect that we have therefore overstated the magnitude of ￿uctuations in allocative
eﬃciency, the job separation rate, and the implied gross employment ￿ows. With part of the
paper￿s stated mission as ￿pre-theoretical,￿ i.e. a guide to future theoretical research, we recog-
nize that the exogenous forcing variables may not indeed be truly exogenous. Our hope is
to stimulate further research into the nature of our ￿ndings to generate even richer theoreti-
cal structures which will eventually weaken the measurement content of our exogenous labor
market state.
34Appendix
AT h e D a t a
Unemployment, U, is the unemployment rate (unemployed persons per member of the labor
force) constructed as a quarterly average of the seasonally adjusted monthly series from the
Current Population Survey (CPS) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); series downloaded
from the CPS home page http://www.bls.gov/cps.
Employment, N, is computed as the identity N =1− U.
The vacancies series, V , represents vacancies per member of the labor force and is con-
structed by multiplying two seasonally adjusted monthly series ￿ the ratio of help-wanted ad-
vertising to unemployed compiled by the Conference Board (downloaded as variable LHELX
from the DRI Basic database), and the unemployment rate U (de￿ned above) ￿ and averag-
ing the monthly values to obtain the quarterly series. The commonly reported help-wanted
advertising index is a scalar transformation of this series.
Consumption, C, is proxied by aggregate output per member of the labor force. The output
variable is real gross domestic product (billions of chained 2000 dollars, seasonally adjusted
annual rate) downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED II database at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPC1.
We divide this series by the seasonally-adjusted civilian labor force (averaged from monthly to
quarterly), appropriately scaled, to express the variable in year 2000 chained dollars per person.
The civilian labor force measure is constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) as part
of the Current Population Survey (CPS) and is downloaded from http://www.bls.gov/cps.
B Estimation of VAR(1) Shock Process
As explained in section 4, solving the model to ultimately recover the histories of the exoge-
nous forcing processes, requires that we complement the log-linearized versions of the eﬃciency
conditions (6)￿(8) with the VAR(1) system (12) summarizing the probability characteristics of
35the shocks:
e et+1 = Ae et + εt+1
where e et =( zt,e χt,e σt)
0, A is a 3 ￿ 3 matrix of constants, and εt =
¡
εzt,εe χt,ε e σt
¢0 is trivariate
normal with Eεt =0and E[εtε0
t]=Σ. Given that we have no information, ap r i o r i , regarding
the 15 distributional parameters comprising the vector θ ￿t h e9 parameters of the VAR(1)
coeﬃcient matrix A and the 6 independent parameters of the variance-covariance matrix Σ ￿
we determine them using a simulated method of moments procedure. Thus, the vector θ is
chosen to minimize the objective function
Q(θ)= [ m − m(θ)]
0 [m − m(θ)]
where m(θ) is a 15￿1 vector of simulated theoretical moments that are implied by the model,







mt, i =1 ,...,15,
where T = 224 is the number of time series observations in our sample of observed exogenous
variables.
Given technology and preference parameters, the estimation procedure is initiated with
three additional pieces of information: 1) an initial guess of the unknown parameters θ0,2 )a
3 ￿ nT draw from a univariate standard normal distribution forming the random matrix u0,
where T =2 2 4 ,a n dn =1 0 , and 3) the initial state-vector (n1,e e1).B y￿xing the 9 coeﬃcients
of matrix A, the initial guess θ0 determines the exact log-linear decision rules (13); it also
determines the 6 independent values of the variance-covariance matrix Σ.G i v e nu and Σ,w e
generate the 3￿nT random matrix ε0, a draw from the trivariate normal distribution N (0,Σ),
as follows. Let R be the Cholesky decomposition of Σ so that R0R = Σ where R is an upper
triangular 3￿3 matrix. The random draw of innovations from the trivariate normal density is






Next, we create a model simulation nT periods in length beginning from an initial state
36equal to the steady state: (n0,e e0)=( 0 ,0). Given the initial draw of innovations {εt}
nT
t=1 ,w e
solve (13) forward producing a simulation nT periods in length, discarding the ￿rst 10 percent
of simulated data observations to remove potential bias due to initial conditions. The simulated







mi (θ), i =1 ,...,15.
Given these simulated moments, we locate the parameter vector θ that minimizes the expression
Q(θ). The initial θ is subsequently replaced with θ =a r g m i n Q(θ), and the next iteration
begins. The algorithm continues in this fashion until Q(θ) <δ ,w h e r eδ is suﬃciently close to
a machine zero to deem the most recent computed θ the solution. The estimation requires that
the same set of innovations be used at each function evaluation ensuring that any reduction
in Q(θ) is due to a better θ, and not to a diﬀerent set of innovations. This clearly poses
a challenge to identify the true vector of structural parameters that minimize Q(θ) in our
problem because Σ is the parameter that determines the process which generates the random
innovations necessary for the simulations. This problem is solved by exploiting the fact that a
joint normal distribution of three random variables could be generated from standard normal
distribution given the parameters de￿ning means and variance of the joint process. Hence, at
each function evaluation we use the same 3 ￿ T random sample, ε, from a standard normal
distribution. This implies that the set of innovations (z,χ and σ) are generated using this ε
and the updated Σ at each step.
In practice, the minimization problem includes two additional constraints. First, for the
exogenous shock process to be stationary, the VAR(1) coeﬃcient matrix A needs to possess
eigenvalues that lie within the unit circle. Second, the variance-covariance matrix Σ is naturally
positive semi-de￿nite. Since it is impossible to impose these two constraints explicitly in the




of the objective function whenever either of these two constraints is violated. Given an initial
guess for θ, this ensures that the algorithm attains a minimum that satis￿es these restrictions.
We determine the moments to be matched with three considerations in mind. First, and
37most obviously, the distributional parameters that we estimate do not aﬀect the ￿rst moments of
the endogenous variables implied by the non-stochastic steady state. Hence, we choose dynamic
covariances between endogenous variables. Second, given that the dynamic behavior of employ-
ment is central to our analysis, the second moments relating employment to aggregate output at
various leads and lags are included. Finally, it is straightforward to choose moments that show
considerable variation with the parameter vector θ.G i v e nt h a tθ primarily determines the dy-
namic behavior of the exogenous forcing variables z, χ,a n dσ, second and higher order moments
of these will generate the most substantial variation. Unfortunately, these are not observed.
The model property allowing labor productivity to be inferred directly from the social plan-
ner￿s feasibility constraint ameliorates this problem somewhat, and thus we apply a considerable
number of moments that relate to z. With these considerations in mind, we match the follow-
ing 15 moments: cov(nt,zt−2),c o v (nt,zt−1),c o v (nt,zt),c o v (nt,zt+1),c o v (nt,zt+2),c o v (nt,ct−2),
cov(nt,ct−1),c o v (nt,ct),c o v (nt,c t+1),c o v (nt,ct+2),c o v (zt,zt−2),c o v (zt,zt−1),v a r (zt),c o v (zt,zt+1),
and cov(zt,zt+2).
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40Table 1. Cyclical Behavior of Observed Labor Market Variables.
Cross-correlation of output with:
Variable (x) %SD x(t − 4) x(t − 3) x(t − 2) x(t − 1) x(t) x(t +1 ) x(t +2 ) x(t +3 ) x(t +4 )
Output (Real GDP) 2.15 .331 .520 .724 .884 1.000 .882 .716 .510 .327
Employment (N)1 .01 .086 .264 .485 .700 .853 .872 .789 .635 .463
Unemployment (U)1 7 .1 −.072 −.257 −.485 −.699 −.850 −.869 −.790 −.641 −.468
Vacancies (V )2 0 .6 .193 .396 .606 .768 .863 .832 .730 .557 .353
V/U 37.0 .141 .340 .562 .752 .875 .867 .775 .609 .415
41Table 2. Cyclical Behavior of the Forcing Variables.
Cross-correlation of output with:
Variable (x) %SD x(t − 4) x(t − 3) x(t − 2) x(t − 1) x(t) x(t +1 ) x(t +2 ) x(t +3 ) x(t +4 )
Inferred Output (Y )2 .15 .331 .520 .724 .884 1.000 .882 .716 .510 .327
Exogenous Forcing Variables:
Productivity (Z)1 .40 .445 .609 .766 .859 .925 .724 .521 .317 .161
Allocational Eﬃciency (χ)3 0 .2 .240 .455 .676 .843 .905 .844 .707 .528 .352
J o bS e p a r a t i o nR a t e(σ)4 7 .7 .175 .376 .598 .785 .896 .874 .767 .595 .406
Gross Employment Flows:
In￿ow (U → N)4 4 .9 .148 .376 .614 .794 .868 .806 .668 .481 .288
Out￿ow (N → U)4 4 .7 .097 .308 .545 .746 .865 .839 .732 .538 .337




















Figure 1: Labor productivity shock (solid) and inferred aggregate output (dashed).


























Figure 2: Allocational eﬃciency shock (solid) and inferred aggregate output (dashed).























Figure 3: Rate of job separation shock (solid) and inferred aggregate output (dashed).
45Figure 4: Implied employment in￿ow (solid line) and out￿ow (dotted line): log-deviations from
trend.
46Figure 5: Implied employment ￿ows per member of the labor force per quarter: in￿ow (solid
line) and out￿ow (dotted line).
47Figure 6: Implied average durations in quarters: unemployment (solid line) and vacancies
(dashed line).
48Figure 7: Implied vacancy durations in quarters: variable allocational eﬃciency (solid line) and
constant allocational eﬃciency (dashed line).
49Figure 8: Implied unemployment durations in quarters: variable allocational eﬃciency (solid
line) and constant allocational eﬃciency (dashed line).
50